Pearl Harbor vs. 9/11
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When asked the question, ÒWhat impresses you more
about George W. Bush and Barack Obama, their absence of intelligence or their
absence of integrity,Ó a ready answer comes to mind, and it is clearly not the
same for each. But in the case of
BushÕs first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, I think you will have to
agree that itÕs a tough call.
That was the first thing that came to my mind
when I saw in the pages of The New York Times that Rumsfeld had essayed
a comparison between the momentous events in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and in
New York City, Arlington, VA, and Shanksville, PA, on
September 11, 2001. The one big
similarity that he was able to note was that—as the official script
reads—we were caught completely by surprise in each case.
In turn, that got me to thinking along the lines
that I lay out in the opening paragraphs of my article, ÒAmericaÕs Dreyfus Affair, the Case of the Death
of Vincent Foster.Ó Suppose you were a professor of United
States history and had the opportunity to give the following assignment to your
students in an exam: ÒCompare and
contrast Pearl Harbor and 9/11.Ó What are the answers that you would be looking
for from your best students?
Surely they would have to say that each of the events resulted in our going to
war. ThatÕs where the
comparison almost has to begin. But
no sooner have we written it than a contrast arises. When Japan attacked us, we were, by
definition, already at war.
Disregarding, for the moment, what might have led up to the attack, one
could hardly say about our war with Japan, as with our subsequent invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, that it was a Òwar of choice.Ó One might argue, however, that the war
with Germany was a war of choice,
even though Hitler declared war on the United States four days later on December 11. His rationale was not, as is commonly
believed, that they were obligated by treaty to do so, but that the United
States had every intention of going to war with Germany after the attack and he
might as well beat us to the punch.
One canÕt read FDRÕs speech of December 9, 1941,
and come to any other conclusion than that Hitler was correct in his
assessment, whether or not the Òbeating to the punchÓ move was wise from a
propaganda perspective. That FDR speech
laid the blame for the Pearl Harbor attack as much on Germany as on Japan and
was clearly intended to prepare the country for war with all three Axis powers,
Germany, Italy, and Japan.
The next
strong comparison that can be made is that the
wars that resulted were wars that powerful people within the United States
government wanted to happen. For
months Roosevelt had been doing almost everything he could to provoke Hitler
into attacking us, but Hitler would not go for the bait. Even RooseveltÕs greatest defenders will
admit that this was true. They
argue that it was simply the right thing to do to ally ourselves
with Britain (and the Soviet Union) against ÒNazi aggression.Ó The big problem,
from that perspective, is that the mood of the country was still strongly
against our involvement in Òforeign wars,Ó based upon our bitter World War I
experience. In a campaign speech on October 30, 1940, as
the European war raged, Roosevelt had catered to the national mood with these
words, ÒAnd while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more
assurance. I have said this before,
but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be
sent into any foreign wars.Ó
Pearl Harbor
got him off the hook that he had created for himself with that promise. It wasnÕt a Òforeign warÓ anymore
because we had been attacked.
Similarly, the
key people in the George W. Bush administration, including Rumsfeld, but also
his top assistant Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney, as members of
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 2000 had called for
precisely the sort of aggressive military policy that followed 9/11, but
acknowledged that it would not happen very quickly Òabsent a catastrophic and
catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor.Ó
Two events
brought PNAC into the mainstream of American government: the disputed election
of George W. Bush, and the attacks of September 11th. When Bush assumed the
Presidency, the men who created and nurtured the imperial dreams of PNAC became
the men who run the Pentagon, the Defense Department and the White House. When
the Towers came down, these men saw, at long last, their chance to turn their
White Papers into substantive policy.
Vice President Dick Cheney
is a founding member of PNAC, along with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle. Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is the ideological father of the group. Bruce
Jackson, a PNAC director, served as a Pentagon official for Ronald Reagan
before leaving government service to take a leading position with the weapons
manufacturer Lockheed Martin.
-- ÒThe Project for the New
American Century,Ó
by William Rivers Pitt
This Ònew
Pearl HarborÓ was something of a godsend to the men whose portraits we see in this video like the original one
was to FDR and to the people behind him.
Maybe the
most important contrast between the two events, again, using only the official
narrative, is that the Japanese attack
plan was, at least tactically, thoroughly rational and depended for its success
upon predictable behavior by the U.S. adversary. By contrast, the 9/11 attacks were
tactically irrational and, on paper, well nigh hopeless, depending as they
did upon unprecedented incompetence on the part the North American Air Defense
Command and amazing docility by airline passengers and crew and no less amazing
competence by novice pilots of airliners.
The Japanese, as we knew, were well served by their espionage agents in
Hawaii and they knew that General Walter Short had not been supplied with an
adequate number of patrol planes to provide sufficient warning by the air
attack from carriers that they planned. *
They also knew from observation that security tended to be somewhat more
relaxed on a Sunday than on any other day.
The Japanese attackers were professionals doing something very similar to
what they must have done many times before in their training.
How could
the supposed 9/11 hijackers have known that the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) would not follow its usual protocol and simply intercept the airplanes very shortly after they
had departed from their normal flight paths? The question holds true in particular
for the attack upon the Pentagon, which occurred a full 51 minutes after the
first plane crashed into the World Trade Center. Through what extraordinary espionage
could the attackers have known in advance that the U.S. Air Force would send up
interceptor jets from Langley Air Force Base in distant Hampton, Virginia, that
would arrive too late, instead of from nearby Andrews Air Force Base just a few
miles away in Maryland or even Bolling Air Force Base
across the river in Washington, DC?
See my satire, ÒBin LadenÕs Home Video: The Missing Portion,Ó for more on this whole question.
The supposed
Al Qaeda plan, as it has been told to us, violated radically the U. S.
militaryÕs KISS (keep it simple, stupid) doctrine and Sun TzuÕs dictum, ÒNever
underestimate your opponent,Ó in The Art of War. The Japanese attack plan, by
contrast, was simple and took due regard of our expected defense.
After Pearl Harbor, scapegoats were blamed and
punished. No one has been punished
for allowing 9/11 to happen. Admiral
Husband Kimmel, in charge of the Pacific Fleet—based at Pearl Harbor
instead of San Diego over the vigorous protests of his predecessor—who had been relieved
of his duty over the issue—and General Short were promptly relieved of
their commands and were later blamed by the Roberts Commission for Òerrors of judgment and dereliction of
duty.Ó
The report
of the Roberts Commission had its counterpart in the 9/11 Commission Report. There are no counterparts to Admiral
Kimmel and General Short in that report, however. To this writerÕs knowledge, no
individual has ever been singled out for punishment for what happened. We have previously summed up the
situation with the following poem:
That Government of the PeopleÉ
The
feds left us unprotected
On that fateful September day.
If
we were a truly free
And
democratic nation
Somebody
up high would pay,
And,
to be sure, there would be
A
proper investigation,
But
wouldnÕt you know, it is we
Who
get detained and inspected.
At Pearl Harbor, from
the very first moment it was obvious that we were being attacked by the
formidable military of a relatively large country population-wise in
Japan. On 9/11, it was not at all
obvious who was attacking us and it is still not to this day. The authorities and the news media were
suspiciously quick to solve the crime and lay the blame on Osama Bin Laden when
they had been suspiciously incompetent in preventing it. In this aspect of the case, 9/11
resembles the Oklahoma City bombing and the two Kennedy assassinations and the
Martin Luther King, Jr., assassination more than it resembles the Pearl Harbor
attack. Moreover, in terms of the
real threat that it represents to the nation, there is a huge difference
between being attacked by a heavily armed country and being attacked by a
ragtag, stateless organization or group of individuals whose armaments amount
to almost nothing.
The strategic objective
of the Japanese was obvious, to gain a large advantage in the shooting-war
phase of its war with the United States.
The 9/11 attacks had no clear objective.
Having
been given an ultimatum by the United
States
that no Japanese government could have accepted, the Japanese leaders initiated
war in precisely the way in which they had been successful in the past. It was either that or be choked and
starved by the U.S. embargo. They
were fully aware that it would bring down the full might of the United States
in retaliation, but they felt they had no choice in the matter. No such rationale existed for Osama Bin
Laden to invite U.S. retaliation in a similar fashion.
In neither case did the
attacks catch everyone on our side by surprise. Our military leaders in Washington,
through the interception and decryption of a message from Tokyo to its
negotiators in Washington, knew beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearl Harbor
would be attacked four hours before the attack took place, but failed to convey
a warning to General Short and Admiral Kimmel until it was too late. They knew by the night before that an attack would
occur somewhere in the Pacific. By
the next morning, when the last part of the cable had been decrypted and they
saw that the negotiators were ordered to deliver their message ending peace
talks at 1 pm Washington time, they could see that the most likely target for
attack was Pearl Harbor. That was
7:30 am Honolulu time, which was approximately dawn, the most likely time for
an attack. See ÒSix Myths of the Traditional Pearl Harbor StoryÓ by Michael T. Griffith
for a good short summary.
No
more than the American public or the American Congress, Short and Kimmel had
not been told about the November 26 ultimatum to Japan that made war virtually
inevitable. The most obvious
conclusion to be reached is that to do so, like alerting them the morning of
December 7 or the evening of December 6, would have resulted in their
preparation to defeat the sort of attack that occurred. JapanÕs spies in Hawaii, it was known,
would have detected these preparations, and the desired war-starting attack
would have been called off.
A
number of people seemed to have had advance notice of the 9/11 attacks. To the list of links provided in this article, one might also add the group of
Òcelebrating IsraelisÓ who got themselves into place to Òdocument the event.Ó In the specific case of Building 7
of the World Trade Center, the BBC and CNN seem to have had prior warning of
its collapse because they reported that it had fallen before it had done so.
As
for the claims by various people in the Bush administration, detailed in this web site, that they could not
possibly have imagined such a stunt as hijacking airliners and flying them into
buildings, they are perhaps best belied by the fact that the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had planned a drill for precisely
that on
the day of the attacks.
From all indications,
the ships at Pearl Harbor that were damaged by the attack either sank or they
did not in accordance with the laws of physics. That seems not to have been the case
with respect the buildings damaged in New York or Arlington,
VA if the official narrative is to be
believed. No one has ever been given any reason to
suspect that Pearl Harbor was a false flag incident. Although General Short had been led to
believe by his superiors in Washington that the greatest danger he faced was
from sabotage, and prepared accordingly, no one has claimed that sabotage
caused any of the damage that occurred on December 7, 1941. By contrast, virtually all of the damage
that occurred on 9/11 bears a very close resemblance to sabotage.
The United States was
able to portray itself purely as a victim in each case. Such ÒvictimologyÓ is completely
consistent with the historical tactics of one particular interest group that
wielded a great deal of power within both the Roosevelt and Bush
administrations. Pearl Harbor
brought the United States into the war against that groupÕs greatest enemy, Nazi
Germany, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, himself, said that the 9/11
attacks were Ògood for Israel.Ó It can also be safely said that Israel
is the only country in the world where the majority of the population favored
the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The comparisons and the contrasts could go on
and on, but we shall conclude by noting that the war in which the United States became involved as a result of Pearl
Harbor was against other countries that would end in the usual way, when one
side or the other surrendered.
Since 9/11, our leaders have told us that we are in a war against a
tactic, an abstract noun, Òterrorism,Ó and that is a war that promises no end. An abstract noun cannot sign
surrender papers.
*
ÒCol. Melvin W. Maas, of the Marine Corps Reserve, former Minnesota
Congressman, said that when two hundred fifty patrol bombers necessary to bring
Hawaii up to required minimum strength of three hundred planes came off the
production lines, Washington ordered them sent to Britain. When protests were made to Roosevelt, he
referred the admirals to Harry Hopkins, in charge of allocating war materials.
ÒÕHopkins
received them as he lay in bed, nonchalantly smoking a cigarette,Õ said
Maas. ÔHe listened to them, then
told them the interview was over and that he had already made the allocation. Adm. Kimmel told me if those two hundred
fifty patrol planes had been sent to Hawaii, the December 7 attack could never
have succeeded, and probably would never have been attempted.ÕÓ (George
Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War, Kindle location
approx. 2300)
David
Martin
April
3, 2014
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